Experts' judgement is employed in offshore risk assessment because reliable failure data for quantitative risk analysis are scarce. The challenges with this practice lies with knowledgebased uncertainties which renders risk expression and estimation, hence components' riskbased prioritisation, subjective to the assessoreven for the same case study. In this paper, a new risk assessment framework is developed to improve the fidelity and consistency of prioritisation of components of complex offshore engineering systems based on expert judgement. Unlike other frameworks, such as the Failure Mode and Effect Criticality Analysis, it introduces two additional dimensions: variables and parameters, to allow more effective scoring. These additional dimensions provide the much needed and uniform information that will assist experts with the estimation of probability of occurrence, severity of consequence and safeguards, herein referred to as 3-D methodology. In so doing, it achieves a more systematic approach to risk description and estimation compared to the conventional Risk Priority Number (RPN) of FMECA. Finally, the framework is demonstrated on a real case study of a wave energy converter (WEC) and conclusions of the assessment proved well in comparison and prioritization.
Introduction
The establishment of effective safety routines ensures extended and efficient operations, increasing production and lowering levelized cost of energy (LCOE), and consequently increasing the competitive advantage of operators. Defined as "…the ratio of the total cost of the power source to the total energy output over its life…" LCOE forms a commonly used metric to compare the costs of various energy generation technologies. Considering that Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) is distributed over a larger production output, as a result of more efficient management lower LCOE holds the key to a significant increase in return on investment (ROI).
Generally, cost of safety processes such as Inspection, Repair and Maintenance (IRM) for offshore energy structures is abysmally high compared to those in onshore locations. An effective maintenance plan deploys the limited resources to target the most urgent failure modes [1, 2] but such decision-making is difficult as it is hard to predict what would be the consequences of a decision, especially when it involves high risk and large uncertainties [3] .
It is in this context that risk analysis is adopted as an essential decision support tool to anticipate all the uncertainties, study the likely outcome and take a guided decision. Risk analysis techniques identify the possible sources of hazards and quantify/estimate the attributes of likelihood of occurrence, consequence and possibility of detection [4] . The challenge of risk analysis approaches for use as a decision support tool lies in the detail to which it is capable of considering risk contributory factors, the clarity of risk expression and risk-level estimation [5] , and the procedure for risk comparison. In situations where there is lack of accurate failure data for use in quantitative analysis, these descriptions are carried out qualitatively by experts who draw from a wealth of long standing experience and common sense in the subject matter to make judgements. However, these judgements suffer linguistic, lexical and informal uncertainties [6, 7] such that analyses' conclusions are subjective to the expert and incomparable [8] .
Amongst the various solutions proposed by different authors [1, [9] [10] [11] , FMEA is the most widely practised [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . FMEA's simplified semi-quantitative framework possesses the combined advantages of quantitative and qualitative features it uses to describe the risk criteria; Occurrence (O), Severity (S) of the effect and Failure detection (D), and integrates them on a multiplicative scale to give a single-point measure of risk ranking as shown in (1) .
However, use of FMEA is not without its own criticisms. In fact in [20, 21] , O, S, and D are classified as high (system)-level evaluation criteria, i.e., ones that give low-levels of detail, and end up in top-level estimates of risk level. Such analysis will lead to results that are not only highly subjective but also non-repeatable [8] . Risk level estimation based on Multiplicative aggregation models, such as found in Risk Priority Number (RPN), are also criticised in [6] , as always giving an inconsistent variance of risk scores. Still on RPN, [22] raises questions on a number of issues, such asi) the use of the ordinal ranking numbers as numeric quantities (i.e., referring to multiplication), ii) the presence of "holes" constituting a large part of the RPN measurement scale, iii) duplicate RPN values with very different combinations of O, S and D scores, and iv) the high sensitivity to small changes. Figure 1 shows the plot of RPN against frequency of a random combination of O, S and D. Holes are shown as portions of discontinuities between successive RPNs in multiplicative scales. The direct consequence of 'sensitivity to small changes' is that errors due to uncertainties associated with the judgement of O, S and D becomes exaggerated. This is demonstrated in (2) and (3) . As can be seen in each of the parentheses of (3), the errors in judgement of O, S and D, denoted as o  , s  and d  respectively, are exaggerated when multiplied. These make FMEA analysis results non-repeatable and subjective, and their interpretation problematic. This paper develops a framework for prioritising components of offshore structures based on estimated risk level as a decision support for resource allocation or other forms of intervention action. Because there will always be more failure modes to mitigate than there are resources available, this makes the framework a cost-effective risk management tool. The basic assumptions of the proposed framework are that: a) risk exposure is a listing of failure modes, variables and parameters, b) the components are exposed differently to different risk sources, c) failure results from a combination of the listed failure modes/mechanism, and d) that any two or more assessors given detailed information on the conditions of exposures will arrive at the same conclusions on frequency of failure, severity of consequence and "provision of safe guards" for each component.
The above assumptions are actually part of the rationale behind the model. Most known risk analysis method follow this assumption of finite listing of failure modes/mechanisms, variables and parameters, whereas in reality, the listing is infinite. This is one of the shortcoming of risk analysis ideology as a whole because it is not the known failure modes/mechanisms, variables and parameters that is the problem, but rather the unknown ones. This is why continuous study of risk is encouraged. The second assumption describes the structure of the model to accommodate cases where the components are exposed to the same risk. In such case the performance scores of the components under the rest of risk sources not considered is set at zero. The third assumption sets the limits of the methodology to generic failure modes/mechanisms highlighting that not-known risks should also be included in the analysis through following a similar rationale as the one developed for the generic ones. Finally, reproducibility of the methodology is a key enabler of this method as it allows to overcome some of the key barriers of traditional risk assessment methods.
Efforts are concerted on achieving a more systematic expression/description and estimation of risk for different components under different failure modes/mechanisms. Though expressions of risk description and estimation broken down to low-levels of detail make risk assessment and decision making process cumbersome, however, it further helps clear areas of uncertainty and most importantly provides documented evidence for arriving at operational decisions, thus reducing errors due to subjectivity. It is in this context that Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) is often employed to handle issues of incomplete information and to facilitate systemic understanding. As part of the required analytical steps, the elicited scores, with parameters' weight are aggregated to derive an index for rank-ordering. These 5 are demonstrated on the real case study of a wave energy converter (WEC). Furthermore, the concept of Safeguard is introduced (expanding the concept of Detection in FMEA) to represent existing failure mitigating measures, recognising the fact that the extent of risk due to a specific failure mechanism is dependent on the availability and efficiency of relevant safeguards.
A Framework for Condition-based Risk assessment model

Understanding risk
To describe the concept of risk, as used in this context, imagine any source of injury or harm (hazard) to assets, personnel, image etc., and an activity (or inactivity) involving that source. 
Complete answers to these questions will contain a set of all the scenarios, probability of frequency (or just frequency) and measures of damages as well as safeguards as shown in (4) . This is referred to as risk. 1 1 1 1
Description of Framework
The methodology proposed in this paper fundamentally consists of elements of risk assessment i.e., identification, analysis and evaluation of hazard sources [4] . The contribution is the systematic approach, depth of analysis and complexity of the systems to which the method is being applied. The framework shares some common features with FMEA in that risk is described by O, S and D. However, unlike the latter, it introduces the concept of Safeguard Gs and further provides more details to assist the Decision Maker (DM) in judgement of these risk descriptors. Variables (x) and Parameters (p) are defined giving indepth information on physical, operational and environmental conditions of the components necessary for making informed judgement. A "fundament unit" of the evaluation sheet has the structure shown in Figure 3 . , ,
where x represents the set of variables representing attributes of physical, operational and environmental conditions that influences O, S, and Gs, and p represents different parameters used to qualify x.
As an illustration, consider the threat of external corrosion ( , = 1) on an offshore component; one of the variables of Occurrence ( ; = 1) being the "Microbial activity of exposure to environment" can be qualified by parameters, ,1 ; = 1,2,3, where 1-class of sediment, 2-organic content of sediment, and 3-availability of nitrogen and phosphorous.
Each parameter is further qualified by a conditions-based class with each class assigned a marching value in a range of 0 -5 on the measurement scale [6, 20] as shown in Table 1 .
The illustration shown in and external force (CEF) and incorrect operations (ICO). An example of a typical evaluation sheet is shown in Figure 4 . This usually will contain as many fundamental units ( Figure 3 ) as there are failure mode/mechanisms. High organic content + N&P 5 8 Figure 4 Layout of assessment spreadsheet
The parameters are usually weighted differently according to importance to the variables and failure modes/mechanisms which they qualify. Different weighting schemes exist; [24] [25] [26] show that each scheme is capable of assigning different sets of weights to the parameter set.
The overall preference values are significantly influenced by these weights. Care should be taken to ensure that the right weighting scheme is applied to the MCDA technique when finding a solution to the multi-criteria decision problem. In the context in which it is used, weighting refers to the relative importance attached to the information carried by each single parameter of the variable of the failure mode/mechanisms. This should guide the choice of weighting method as the meaning of weighting differ across the various weighting methods.
More elaboration has been provided in section 2.4. The ideas developed in this framework are applicable only to structures in the offshore environment and cannot be used out of context.
Methodology
There are three parts to the 3-D analysis framework: i) information gathering and documentation, ii) Multi-criteria risk analysis (description and estimation and evaluation), and iii) risk aggregation to overall preference value. These are discussed in the following subsections.
Database build up: information gathering and documentation
Records of relevant information required for the risk assessment are held in the database.
Such information includes assumptions and justification comments that might have been
utilised. Databases serve to ensure that the views of the assessor at the time of assessment are captured and documented for future reference and updating. Subsequent assessments of failure mode and mechanisms, variables and parameters, following further
inspection/monitoring data collection can understand quickly the rationale behind the previous ones and modify accordingly. Based on characteristics of the variables, they are classified as belonging to one likelihood of O, S and Gs, in a similar way to that used in [27] .
More so, it is worthy to mention here that only risk due to progressive failures alone have been considered. Reduction of risk due to accidental failure have to consider the availability of -and effectiveness of -other safety provisions such as emergency exit and evacuation plans.
Multi-criteria risk analysis: description, evaluation and score elicitation
The risks inherent in each component are described in terms of the parameters of the variables of the failure modes/mechanisms. In this framework, risk criteria are constituted by these parameters. Therefore, it is good practice to first get the database ready for application before commencement of evaluation. This ensures consistency of assessment across all components of the infrastructure. Figure 5 shows the steps in the application of a 3-D risk assessment framework. As can be seen from the framework, the first step in the analysis of a structural system is to decompose it into constituent components. These components will perform differently across various failure modes/mechanisms from a risk perspective. This step is followed by multicriteria risk analysis of the structural componentsi.e., description and estimation of risk from the perspective of different variables (of the failure modes) and elicitation of appropriate parameter -specific performance scores (values) based on evaluation against the preference scales [11, 28] . The outcome multi-criteria risk analysis is decision matrix V, with rows and columns as components and variables respectively, shown in (5). 
Risk evaluation is strongly reliant on judgements by a team of experts drawn from diverse disciplines, such as material, corrosion, inspection, production, maintenance, process etc. It is expected that years of experience, added to provision of detailed information, will better inform experts in making good judgement of O, S and Gs.
Score aggregation and ranking
In this step, the parameter-specific performance scores are aggregated in a relational way that makes comparison and ranking of the components possible. By aggregating the parameterspecific performance scores, an attempt is made to model failure scenarios, described as listing of, and interaction amongst, failure modes (as well as variables and parameters). Two aggregation approaches are presented in this paper to demonstrate possible treatments of the parameter -specific performance scores in the analysis of failure modes/mechanisms of the fundamental unit(s). As the name implies, a global aggregation approach aggregates all parameter-specific performance scores of components across all the fundamental units into a 
Application of TOPSIS in Multi-criteria risk assessment
MCDA have different types of algorithms for aggregating performance scores and weights of criteria into preference values bases on which the alternatives can be ranked. [30] recommended the use of additive and/or subtractive algorithms as against multiplicative and/or divisive algorithms which disproportionately exaggerate inaccuracies inherent in scores elicitation. A widely used MCDA technique that utilises additive algorithm is TOPSIS (Technique for Ordered Preferences using Similarity to the Ideal Solution) [31, 32] . Also a process that can be understood and treated under the discipline of MCDA. Similar applications of TOPSIS have been reported in the literature; [33] , [34] presented approaches to prioritizing failure modes as an alternative to FMEA; [35] [36] [37] [38] presented different approaches to the assessment and selection of support structure configuration for wind turbine projects, while [39] 's approach studied the influence of knowledge background on "risks to the development of tidal energy". In related applications in the construction industries, TOPSIS has been applied in a risk criticality study and the ranking of a construction object [40, 41] .
Steps to implementing TOPSIS
In the context used here, evaluation criteria refer to variables and parameters of failure modes. TOPSIS is implemented for the decision matrix V (5) in the following steps.
Step (I): Normalization of decision matrix
13
The values in the decision matrix of alternatives (5) are normalized based on (6). Step (II): Weighted normalized values
Step (III): Derivation of A* and A -, the positive and negative ideal solutions where J1 is the set of benefit attributes and J2 is the set of cost attributes.
Step (IV): Calculation of separation measures i.e., n-dim. Euclidean distance metric
The separation from the positive-ideal solution A * is given by
The separation from the negative-ideal solution A  is given by
Step (V): Calculate similarities to the positive-ideal solution, as follows:
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Step (VI): Choose the alternatives in the decision matrix with the maximum * i C and rank these alternatives from most-to least-preferred according to * i C in descending order.
Weighting Method
Weighting plays important role in ordering preferences of alternatives. The interpretation of weight is different for different weighting methods. The weighting method is broadly classified into Subjective and Objective methods [42] and Hybrid method [43] . [42] . In the direct rating method, the decision maker is asked to show the importance of each criterion in an ordinal scale. Ranges of scales vary but commonly used ranges are 1-5, 1-7, or 1-10 [44] . This method puts no constraint on the expert's responses, i.e. the weights are not normalized. In addition, the expert has the liberty to adjust the weight of any criterion without altering the values of others. Criteria weighting by Ranking method is carried out in three sub-methods; rank sum, rank reciprocal, and rank exponential [45] . Moving towards class of weighting method known as the direct subjective method, is Point Allocation [46] . Here, criteria weight is determined by the decision maker who allocates numbers directly to the criteria from a fixed point to reflect their importance and such that the sum of all the weights equals that fixed point value. It is a very easy method of weighting often adopted for demonstrative purposes only as the weights given by this method are not always precise [42] . This method suits the purpose of this paper which is to demonstrate the proposed risk assessment methodology and is adopted here.
Besides TOPSIS, other MCDA approaches have been applied in risk assessment processes.
[47] presented a hybrid model to estimate the weight of risk criteria using AHP which were used in ranking Failure Modes in PROMETHEE. [48] used Measuring Attractiveness by a Categorical Based Evaluation Technique (MACBETH) to categorise critical sources of risk to ALSTOM power for meditative purposes. [49] presented an approach to the selection of maintenance strategy industrial plants using the Analytical Hierarchical process (AHP).
These applications show the resourcefulness of MCDA in engineering decision making.
Generic Failure Mechanisms of Offshore Energy Structures
This section presents a list of failure mechanisms widely applicable in the offshore energy industry. Records on accidents, incidents, and near misses are valuable industry assets; they form the basis for improvements and advancement in safety. Much of this information is reported in technical papers [7, [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] , and databases such as WOAD and SPARTA [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] .
Because some failures are induced by incorrect operation, knowledge can be gained about such failures by evaluating practices against relevant standards and recommended practices such as [63] [64] [65] . This information is systematically crystallized out and analysed using analysis techniques. At present, there are available collections of possible failure modes/mechanism of offshore energy structures and the underlying factors influencing them.
In the development of this paper, many techniques were used to identify offshore failure modes and mechanisms. These included but not limited to, questionnaire survey that targeted foremen and operators of various equipment, experts' views that targeted consultants and researchers from academia, and business owners. Reports, Standards and Failure databases were also reviewed extensively. The search yielded 23 risk parameters from nine failure modes, as presented in Table 2 . 
Case study of Wave Energy Converter systems
The case study used in this work as a reference application is a prototype Wave Energy Converter (WEC) located in Dawanshan Island in Guangdong Province, China and operating at a water depth of 28m, and maximum tidal range of 2.5m at the point of deployment.
Overview of WEC System function
The physical boundaries and functional integration of the WEC are delineated by the block diagram as shown in Figure 7 . Figure 11 shows a schematic of a hydraulic cylinder. Figure 11 Longitudinal cross-section of double-rod double-acting cylinder Other damages common to these structures, as reported in [67] are due to O-rings, cracking of glands, damage to bearings and seals. These damages are associated with misalignment of the load (e.g., bent rod). They cause poor clearances through which leakages can occur.
Another cause of poor clearance is bad assembly. A split weld around the base and ports of cylinders is another damage feature commonly observed. These are caused by stressincreasing mechanisms, such as fatigue, and/or stress-induced, such as manufacturing defect, welding, assembly and construction. There is the possibility of fracture from being operated beyond recommended conditions. Such mechanisms are considered here under "Incorrect operation". Lastly, contamination of the hydraulic fluid by seawater, and corroded, eroded or worn out parts, such as the end cap can potentially cause failure in delivering the hydraulic fluid to the motor. This has a root cause as wrong operations are usually from wrong filter size or operating at a high case pressure.
Motor and Generator:
The hydraulic cylinder transfers the fluid at high pressure to the motor which turns the turbine. The major failure modes of motor and generator are highlighted in studies by [68] [69] [70] . They include but not restricted to, excessive leakage, seal failure and noise. At a component level the failure modes are identified as follows; corrosion (in winding and magnets), spalling, wear (in bearing and blades), overload -impact (seal, blade, shaft and bearing), adjustment error during welding assembly, construction and/or manufacturing leading to misalignment of shaft, rotor asymmetry, bearing shells and/or roller element, fatigue as experienced in shaft, slip ring and blade. Pipeline: The pipeline serves as a channel through which hydraulic fluid moves from the cylinder to the motor-generator set. This may suffer crack or burst (in the worst cases) due to overloading and impact. The occurrence of these failure modes could be further aggravated by internal and/or external corrosion at a rate that is influenced by parameters such as ambient temperature and moisture content, corrosivity of hydraulic fluid etc. Fatigue may result from dynamics associated with fluid flowing in a pipe or from vibration due to assembly error, i.e., too big a clearance, resulting in misalignment and mostly caused by errors in welding, assembly and construction and/or manufacturing defects.
Gas accumulator:
The gas accumulator is used to maintain stability of flow by keeping the pressure of the pipeline at the required level. In bladder-type gas accumulators, the flexible bladder holds the compressible gas at the pre-charged pressure and may rupture in the event of overloading or impact during pre-charging or an out-of-proportion reduction in system pressure. Other causes of rupture are incorrect compression ratio, incorrect pre-charge pressure [71] which are all incorrect operations. Fatigue failure may also be experienced in the spring and poppet assembly of the gas accumulator.
Valves: A pattern can be drawn between type of valve and failure. However, reference is made here of generic types as found in [72] [73] [74] . and construction, and incorrect/defective/improper operational procedures (such as wrong specification, human factor). It is very common to expect incorrect operation where manufacturing and material defects are observed, where in fact, the problem is not the valve itself but something that has been done to affect the valve operation. This is said to constitute 50% of the causes of valve incidents [72] .
Demonstration of Implementation of 3-D framework
This section demonstrates the implementation of the 3-D framework, as documented in section 2, on a real system of a WEC. A single variablemicrobial activity level in the sedimentof the threat of external corrosion (Table 2) is used for demonstrative purposes in 23 order to illustrate the concept of parameters and variables. Table 3 shows the performance of the components of a WEC exposed to microbial activity. Score has been elicited according to current conditions of the variables. The weights of the criteria are derived by the point allocation method [42] . In a more detailed assessment, it is recommended that a more robust method such a AHP [34, [75] [76] [77] be used in determining the weights. The evaluation was carried out by a team of five experts involved in the WEC project and drawn from Cranfield University, UK and the National Ocean Technology Center, Tianjin, China. Each of the components of the WEC had been assessed under the parameters and had scores assigned to them as provided by the evaluation scale. The set of positive-ideal, + and negative-ideal, − solutions as derived for the normalized decision matrix from (8) and (9) respectively are:
A * = {0.014, 0.051, 0.035, 0.039, 0.017} (13) A -= {0.000, 0.003, 0.001, 0.001, 0.007} (14) Measures of separation from positive and negative ideal solutions as derived from (10) The similarity to both + & − solutions is computed as given in (12) . 
The risk performance indices for the different components are expressed in (17) . This is presented in bar chart form in Figure 12 . It can be deduced from Figure 12 that 54% of the risk of external corrosion due to activities of microbial activities lies in just 19% of the components. These components are: wave buoy and the frame, and the two joints. The results of a full scale implementation of the framework on the structure and incorporating variables from all the threats and failure modes will be presented in the next section.
Result and Discussion
A total of 21 components of the WEC were analysed and evaluated against 112 parameters of the nine generic failure mechanisms. Figure 13 shows the results of the global aggregation approach i.e., the plot of [ ] as described in 2.3.3. It can be seen from Figure 13 The threats that develop through these failure modes/mechanisms should be monitored through inspection. Another way the data of Table 4 can be treated is to perform row -sum which gives the total risk content of the components. This gives an interesting pattern when normalised ( Figure 14 ) that captures the distributions of failure mode/mechanism -specific risks for each component of the system. This analysis avails the assets manager/engineer the knowledge of susceptibility of the various components of the asset to the failure mode/mechanisms; the results which will serves as a supports tool to the asset manager/engineer who may be required to defend maintenance decisions from time to time such as setting priority of failure mode to mitigate for each component. In this paper, a framework is developed to support prioritisation of components of offshore engineering systems based on risk levels for intervention action, leading to inspection, repair and maintenance. The advantage of this framework is the systematic way it incorporates a wide range of evaluation criteria and still demonstrates clarity in risk level estimation, aggregation and prioritisation in a manner that ensures repeatability. Precision of ranking is enhanced through a combination of actions; firstly, an updatable database is developed for failure modes, risk variables and parameters. These parameters hold information on operating conditions -normal and/or upset, current and projected future of the components, required in order to make informed judgement of occurrence, severity of failure modes and safeguards.
This enhances the traceability of the assessment outcomes to the source data. The direct implication of this is that the model can easily be updated with the latest information as obtained from inspection findings. Also, it addresses epistemic uncertainties and ensures uniformity of application during the evaluation process. Secondly, it minimizes subjectivity in risk evaluation through consideration of weighting at parameters levelswhich qualify the variables of failure modes. This is in contrast to the practice in FMEA where weights are considered at the failure mode level resulting in a high subjective model. For demonstrative purposes, these weights had been derived through a point allocation process. Thirdly, it provides a systematic way of application of risk assessment across components of complex engineering systems such that is possible to perform risk assessment of different components simultaneously with a lower risk of subjectivity, and reduced inaccuracy.
The framework has been implemented on a real offshore structure, a WEC, and the results obtained showed to have practical implications to efficient IRM management of components of offshore energy structures. Initial prioritisation of components by global aggregation approach is usually based on previous inspection records. Subsequent prioritisation requires up-to-date information via inspections finding that target prioritised components. If a component shows no sign of developing defectby maintaining the same relative position in the priority scale for recurring inspectionit should be credited by increasing the time to the following inspection. In other words, the question of "how often to inspect" is addressed.
More so, the efficiency of IRM can be further enhanced by suggesting "what to inspect". This is where the second analysis -local aggregation approach -finds application. A scatter plot For the case study presented, it should be noted that the result is validated based on the experience of the participating researchers in the project. This is due to the fact that the area of renewable energy is relatively new, as such there are not enough data for validation.
Though an attempt is made in this paper to list as many failure mode/mechanism and variables and parameters as possible, such analysis inherently is perforce finite; whereas in reality such list is infinite. However, the model is highly flexible in terms of accommodating new found failure modes/mechanisms, variables and parameters and can be adapted for many purposes. Identification and inclusion of new failure modes/mechanisms, variables and parameters as more knowledge is gained is dependent on the experience assessor.
